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THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST AS AN EXPERT WITNESS*
Ar.NoLD M. RosE**
There-is a possibility that social scientists will increasingly be
used in the future as expert witnesses in court cases of several
kinds, and therefore some exploration is needed as to the kinds of
service the social scientists can provide, and as to their limitations
as expert witnesses. Louisell' has made a most constructive start
on this discussion in relation.fo the work of psychologists. Calm, 2
also a lawyer, has analyzed the social science testimony in the
school segregation cases, and, while his article is most thoughtful,
he has made a number of statements which represent to the social
scientists a serious misunderstanding of their work. The present
article, written by a sociologist, will seek to contribute to the discussion by: (1) analyzing the characteristics of the social sciences
insofar as they are pertinent to providing expert testimony; (2)
suggesting the limitations of social science testimony; (3) indicating at least some of the areas of legal cases in which social science
testimony has already been used and other areas in which it might
well be used, (4) specifying how the methodology of social science
differs from the traditional methodology of lawyers and judges, and
indicate how the former may be used to supplement the latter; (5)
suggesting some attitudes which lawyers and judges should have
toward social scientists when they provide expert testimony in
order to get the most value from their services. Since a thorough
treatment of all of the above subjects cannot be achieved within the
confines of a single article, this piece should be regarded as part
of a continuing effort to discover the optimal relationship between
law and the social sciences rather than as a definitive study. The
field is too nebulous to permit a definitive study, and when the
latter can be accomplished it will not be done by a sociologist working by himself. This writer's particular qualifications for contributing to the discussion consist of a single experience as an expert
witness, participation in preparing some of the briefs in the school
segregation cases, and a long interest in the relation of law to the
social sciences.3
*This paper was prepared while the author mas engaged on a Rockefeller
Foundation research grant Appreciation is expressed to the Foundation and to
Professors David Louisell and Monrad Paulsen of the University of Minnesota Law School for an advance reading of the paper.
**Professor of Sociology, University of Minnesota.
1. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39 Minn. L.
Rev. 235 (1955).
2. Cahin, Jurisprudence,30 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 150 (1955).
3. The writer is also author of Problemsin the Sociology of Lau, and
Law Enforcement, 6 Journal of Legal Educ. 191 (1953), and co-outhor of
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Herein "social sciences" means those theoretical disciplines
which seek to understand and predict human behavior in terms of
general principles empirically tested. This includes-in aim if not in
achievement-most of sociology, psychology, anthropology, political
science, economics and parts of psychiatry, history, and law itself.
It does not include the study of particular cases for the purpose of
handling them in some way, hence most of psychiatry, clinical psychology, accounting and other business school subjects, social work,
and law are excluded. It also does not include the study of particular cases for the purposes of understanding these cases as special events in their own right, hence much of history and law are
excluded. Of the fields mentioned, psychiatry,4 social work, accounting, law (of course), and perhaps history (in cases where the
"intent of the legislature" is in question) have been used extensively in providing expert testimony But these are not social sciences
in our definition, and hence may have led to some misunderstanding as to the role the social sciences can play in court cases. Of the
social sciences proper only economics seems to have been used
extensively, and therefore will not be dealt with further except to
cite a case in which it was pertinent, so as to provide an illustration
of its similarity to other possible social science testimony
In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppinger,5 the patentee was licensing a
salt-vending machine and requiring the purchase of the salt tablets
at the same time. The courts have held this illegal on the ground
that the patentee is attempting to extend his monopoly beyond the
area which has been granted to him. Economists pointed out that
the only monopoly power the patentee has before and after the tie-in
is based on the monopoly power of the patent (that is, on the
machine, not the salt) If the monopoly power of the patentee is
strong enough to compel the purchase of salt by the licensee, it
would also be strong enough to compel the licensee to pay more for
the license to use the salt-vending machine. Thus there are no
economic consequences for the patentee or the licensee or the conDoes the Pumshment Fit the Crime? A Study ii Social Evaluation, 61 American Journal of Sociology 247 (1955)
4. A good recent summary of the problems in the relationship between
psychiatry and the law appears in Guttmacher and Weihofen, Psychiatry and
the Law (1952). For a consideration of the even more recent Durham case
(214 F 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954)), consult the proceedings of the conference
on Insainty and the Law held at the University of Chicago, February 28,
1955, and, Schiele and Paulsen, Psychiatric Evidence in Legal Tests of
Insanity, 26 Bulletin of the University of Minnesota Hospitals and Minnesota
Medical Foundation 325 (1955).
5. 314 U. S. 488 (1942). This case was brought to the writer's attention by Levi, Four Talks on Legal Education, 1, 34 (University of Chicago
Law School 1952).
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sumer because of the tie-in requirement, although other wholesalers
of salt are hurt. The testimony of economists in cases involving
anti-trust legislation, licensing, taxation, labor law, corporations,
and trade regulations seems to be widely used and accepted in the
courts. 6 While the general nature of economists' testimony is relevant here, main consideration will be given to case material from the
testimony of sociologists, psychologists, and other social scientists
where there seems to be questioning among lawyers regarding its
pertinence and reliability.
The relevance of social science findings to court cases will have
to be ascertained, case by case, by perspicacious lawyers. As yet,
according to Louisell, "there seem to be few cases and little recent
discussion directly concerned with the psychologist (or any social
scientist) functioning as an expert witness himself. . we search invain for any substantial analysis . . of the psychologist functioning as an expert witness."17 Louisell, who has scoured the literature,
mentions only two reports of cases" of psychologists presenting
expert testimony other than of a clinical kind, and one of these is
a case which he reports in extenso himself. Both of the cases cited
by Louisell involve public opinion surveys done by competent psychologists--one regarding the meaning of a commercial advertisement to an average reader and the other involving the question as
to whether the patrons of a certain- theater regarded it as a "neighborhood theater" or as one which attracted them as a downtown
theater would. °
The latter case may'0 be used to illustrate how an opinion survey-to do which psychologists and sociologists have developed
special techniques of research -differs from the usual methods of
the lawyer. The theater was suing the distributor for treating it as a
neighborhood theater rather than as a city-wide theater in the distribution of films. The theater was located outside the downtown
area. A university psychologist was hired to make a survey of the
patrons to determine two things; (1) the geographic distribution of
6. Levi, op. cit. stpranote 5, at 7, 47
7 Louisell, stpranote 1, at 236, 238.
-8. United States v. 38 Dozen Bottles, 114 F Supp. 461 (D. Minn.
1953); Robbinsdale Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing
Corp., Civil No. 4584 (4th Div. Minneapolis).
9. Lomsell, supra nofe 1, at 249-250. Discussion of other uses of public
opinion surveys may be found in Waterbury, Opmnion Suveys itn Ciil
Litigation, 17 Public Opinion Quarterly 71 (1953) ; Kennedy, Law and the
Courts, The Polls and Public Opinion 92-108 (Meier and Saunders 1949);
Sylvester, Consumer Polls as Evidence in Unfair Trade Cases, 20 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 211 (1951).
10. Robbinsdale Amusement Co. v. Warner Bros. -Pictures Dist. Corp.,
Civil No. 4584 (4th Div. Minneapolis).
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the patrons to ascertain if they were from the immediate neighborhood or from all over the city, (2) the attitudes of the patrons as to
whether they would be willing to pay "downtoNn prices" for firstrun films usually shown only at downtown theaters. The psychologist and his assistants asked a representative sample of the theater's
patrons for their address and their opinion about paying downtown
prices. The fact of widespread distribution of their residences and
their willingness to pay downtown prices were presented in court to
support the theater's claim to be treated as a city-wide theater by the
distributor. Apparently in previous cases of this sort lawyers had
relied on the location of the theater, had as witnesses a few patrons
who lived a great distance from the theater and who would be willing to pay downtown prices, but never a representative sample of
patrons. Thus, the selection of a representative sample of patrons for
the beliefs and for facts about themselves is a technique which the
public opinion specialist can contribute to certain court cases.
Kendler 1' reports a case in which experimental social psychological evidence was incorporated into a lawyers' brief amicus
curiae. In 1943 the Territory of Hawaii passed a law prohibiting
schools from teaching foreign languages to children under the age
of ten or who had not completed the fourth grade or who were
under the age of fifteen and were below average in English courses.
Their purpose was to discourage ethnic enclaves, but the law's
stated purpose was indicated by the clause holding that early bilingualism "may and do, in many cases, cause serious emotional
disturbances, conflicts and maladjustments." The constitutionality
of this act was challenged in the U S. Supreme Court, and the
American Jewish Congress submitted a brief amicius curiae which
rested on three contentions. (1) The teaching of certain languages
- e.g. Hebrew, Latin - is a religious obligation, and no law could
constitutionally abridge religious freedom, (2) it has not been
established that bilingualism has the negative effects attributed to it
by the law, evidence from psychological tests showed no greater
proportion of emotional disturbances or maladjustment, (3) the
law was not an effective instrument for accomplishing its stated
purpose, since sociological study showed that it was the home
rather than the school which induced bilingualism. Before the Court
considered this brief, it threw the case out on technical grounds, and
shortly thereafter the Hawaiian legislature substantially modified
the act, so that the psychological and sociological evidence never
received judicial notice.
11. Kendler, Contributions of the Psychologist to Constitutional Law,
5 American Psychologist 505 (1950).
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During World War II, the political scientist Harold D. Lasswell and some of his assistants appeared in court to testify in government cases seeking to show that certain "native fascist" organizations were in communication with the German government."
They demonstrated that the propaganda put out for American consumption by these organizations was in many cases identical with
that prepared by the German propaganda ministry. The sociologist
Robert Sorensen-has analyzed the possibilities of using the same
technique_ (called "content analysis") as evidence in literary infringement cases, although he and his lawyer-collaborator cite no
cases where the technique was actually employed. 3 A rough approximation of the technique has been used in the form of making
a systematic summary of parallel statements in the two published
sources when one is claimed as a copyright infringement on the
other.14 Clearly, if there are other cases involving the use of nonclinical social science testimony, it would be valuable to have them
reported, therefore a summary of a case in which the author presented expert testimony follows.
The case involved the disposition of a three-year-old child
whose mother the court had previously declared incompetent on
grounds of immorality. The county welfare office was now seeking
to have the child taken from the father-who lived apart from his
wife-and placed with foster parents, while the father was strongly
contesting this action. No allegation was made that the father did
not provide the proper moral surroundings for the child; the social
worker in charge of the case specifically testified that the father
provided the child with proper physical care and the affection expected from a parent. The county welfare office's contentions were
three: (1) the father was 60 years old-too old to be a proper
father for a young child (although he was in perfect physical health
for his age) ; (2) there was no mother in the home (although the
father agreed to hire a competent full-time housekeeper, and lie had
the income to do so) ; (3) the father was a mulatto identified with
the Negro community whereas the child was white in appearance
(the mother was white in all known racial antecedents). There was
an implication that the father of the child was not the biological
father (the biological father was alleged to be one of the white
paramours of the mother), although no evidence was presented to
12. Lasswell and Leites, Language of Politics (1949).
13. R. C Sorensen and T. C. Sorensen, A Proposal for the Use of
Content Analysis Evidence in Literary Infringement Cases, 33 Social Forces
262 (1955).
14. See Morse v. Fields, 127 F Supp. 63 (S.D. N.Y. 1954).
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this affect (except a questioning oral statement made by the father
to the social worker a year previously) and the mother denied it
under oath. There was no question but that the father was the
social father of the child, as it had been reared by him since its
birth.
The attorney for the father had reason to believe that the third
contention was most important in the minds of the social workers
at the county welfare office. They seemed to believe that a whiteappearing child could gain better opportunities in life by being
raised by a white couple than by a mulatto father. Whether or not
they were disturbed by the idea of a white child being raised as a
Negro could not be said. As a sociologist who has studied the Negro
community and race relations, this author was asked to serve as an
expert witness for the father. After taking the witness stand, and
establishing position and field of competences, the following relevant
facts were testified to
1. While Negroes in Minneapolis had historically been subject
to certain occupational and educational discriminations, these
were rapidly declining and at the present rate of change
could be expected to be inconsequential in a few years. The
sources were decennial reports on the occupational, employment, and educational status of Negroes and whites from
the U. S. Census, also a few miscellaneous reports from the
U. S. Office of Education and the U S. Employment Service.
2. Neighborhoods in Minneapolis were increasingly characterized by mixed occupancy, only a small minority of neighborhoods could be characterized as entirely Negro or entirely
white at the time of the 1950 census (and even fewer by
1954, the time of this case) The sources were the block
statistics of the U S. Census and a special sample survey
made in 1954.
3. A small number of persons identified socially as Negroes
were not distinguishable in physical appearance from whites,
there had been such persons in Negro communities for generations, and Negroes generally accorded high status to
such persons. The sources were a number of community
studies made by sociologists over twenty-five years.
4. Whites generally either were unaware that Negroes who appeared to be whites were socially Negroes or tended to treat
them better than they did Negroes who physically appeared
to be Negroes. In other words, a white-appearing Negro
child would not be subjected to more discriminations than a
Negro-appearing Negro child, and possibly fewer The
sources were studies of the differential status and "passing"
habits of Negroes of different shades of skin color.

I SOCIAL SCIENTIST
At several points in this testimony the writer brought out the
fact that he knew nothing of the individual circumstances of this
case, but was testifying solely on the basis of his own and other
sociologists' published studies of the Negro community and race
relations. The lawyer for the county welfare board, in crossexamination, did not contest any of the statements, but confined
himself to asking two questions: (1) Whether the author's long
study of the Negro question had not biased his point of view and
observations, (my reply was that social scientists were very much
aware of the possibilities of bias and tried to hold it in check, but
that bias was ,still possible), (2) Whether there were not special
discriminations faced by a person known to be a Negro which were
not faced by a person known to be white (to which the witness
assented, but pointed out that such discriminations were de-

creasing).
The judge seemed to be greatly interested in this testimony and
asked a number of questions. Apparently he never had previously
been offered such a wide array of census reports and specific sociological studies; in such cases lawyers usually present a more limited
body of reports and "common knowledge." One of the questions
asked by the judge raised the issue of conflicting expert testimony.
A, competent geneticist had testified on a previous occasion that, on
the basis of his observation of the physical and behavioral characteristics of the father and the child, "It is hardly necessary to list
such differences, as it is apparent that Mr. V could not have been
the biological father of this boy A blood test of the mother, Mr. W
and-Gregory (the child) would demonstrate conclusively that Mr.
W could not possibly have been the biological father of Gregory
W." Following this, the lawyer for the father had a competent technician (a doctor of medicine) take a blood test of mother, father
and child, and on the basis of this the technician concluded that,
"On the basis of the above listed blood factors, in my opinion,
G. W. cannot be excluded as the father of the child Gregory ,r."
The judge asked the writer's opinion of the testimony of the
geneticist. My answer was that an inspection of the physical and
behavioral characteristics of two persons could not exclude the possibility of their relationship, that the blood test and any other known
objective test could exclude certain categories of persons from relationship to another but could not possibly exclude all non-relatives,
and that the only adequate test of relationship in this case was an
honest statement by the mother. The judge was thus faced with conflicting testimony given by an expert geneticist and an expert so-
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ciologist on a question more closely related to genetics than to
sociology
There were other facets to the case (although everything pertinent to the points raised in my testimony has been reported) and
the case was carried on for several days. Eventually the judge
ordered that the child be allowed to remain with the father.
The expert social science testimony in the school segregation
cases is part of the record, and is probably familiar by now to most
interested lawyers. 15 In briefest summary, the issue of all these
cases was whether segregation involved discrimination. Discrimination, when practiced by an arm of the state, has consistently been
declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. If state
facilities were "separate but equal" they were considered legal following the 1896 Supreme Court decision of Plessy v. Ferguson.'
In a series of decisions beginning in 1938,17 the Supreme Court
narrowed the interpretation of what it considered to be equal. The
material discrimination declared illegal related to such matters as
the size of classes, the salaries of teachers, the physical condition of
the school plant, and the distance required to travel to school. By
1950, in the case of McLatrn v Oklahoma State Regents,5 the
Court had gone so far as to declare that professional school students
were being discriminated against if they did not have the possibility
-because of state action-of interacting with their future professional colleagues, even in college cafeterias and libraries. But the
decision in the McLaurm case did not challenge segregation head on,
and the Plessy doctrine presumably stood as law In the South Carolina case of Briggs v. Elliott,"9 the state acknowledged the facts of
material discrimination and asked that the decision be solely on the
question of segregation (the attorney general promised that material discrimination would be eliminated in five years.) Thus, by
1953, both sides were willing to argue on the single issue as to
15. One of the main briefs in the Supreme Court cases leading to the
decision of May 17, 1954 (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483
(1954)) is reprinted in The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
Desegregation. A Social Science Statement, 37 Minn. L. Rev. 427 (1953)
The social scientists' brief in the case involved in the decree of May 31, 1955
(Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U. S. 294 (1955)) was partly incorporated in the regular lawyers' brief of the NAACP (This decree also disposed of Briggs v. Elliot, Davis v. County School Board, and Gebhart v.
Belton) The leading social scientist in the preparation of these briefs for
the NAACP was Professor Kenneth B. Clark of City College, New York.
Lawyers may find his summary for social scientists interesting, Desegregation. An Appraisal of the Evidence, 9 Journal of Social Issues 2 (No. 4
1953)
16. 163 U. S.537 (1896)
17 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938)
18. 339 U. S. 637 (1950)
19. 98 F Supp. 529 (1951)
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whether racial segregation itself inevitably involved discrimination.
This- is a question of social fact, not a matter either of law or of
ethics, and both sides brought in social scientists as expert witnesses. The social scientists began to bring in evidence as early as
1946 m the first case of Sweatt v. Painter 0 By 1952, they were offering new kinds of studies that directly linked segregation with
discrimination: Negro children in segregated schools were found
to have a sense of inferiority and a lowered morale, and it was
alleged that these hampered the learning process. Less evidence, but
some, was adduced to the effect that white children were encouraged
in a sense of racial superiority by segregated schools. Clark summarizes succinctly the types of evidence offered by social scientists
in the various school cases:
1-That racial classification for the purposes of educational
segregation was arbitrary and irrelevant since the available
scientific evidence indicates that there are no innate racial
differences in intelligence or other psychological characteristics ... this line of testimony was consistently unchallenged by the attorneys for the states.
2-That contemporary social science interpretations of the
nature of racial segregation indicates that it blocks communication and increases mutual hostility and suspicion, it
reinforces prejudices and facilitates rather than inhibits outbreaks of racial violence. 3-That segregation has detrimental personality effects, upon
Negro children which impair their ability to profit from the
available educational facilities. Segregation also has certain
complex detrimental effects upon the personality and moral
develcpment of white children.
4-That the consequences of desegregation are in the direction
of the improvement of interracial relations and an increase
in social stability rather than an increase in violence or social
chaos.
5-That, if non-segregation can work on the graduate and professional level, it can work equally well on the elementary and
high school level since children at this stage of development
are more flexible in their attitudes and behavior.2'
Whether the Supreme Court relied heavily on this evidence is a
moot point, 22 but in its 1954 decision it did refer to this testimony in
20. 339 U. S. 629 (1950).
21. Clark, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness ti Civil Rights
Litigation, 1 Social Problems 5, 7 (1953).

22. The issue has been raised by Calm, op. cit. supra note 2. Neither the
active advocates nor opponents of desegregation have questioned the crucial
role of the social science evidence. See, e.g., Speech of Honorable James 0.
Eastland before U. S. Senate, 101 Cong. Rec. 6068 (daily ed. May 26, 1955) ;
and the speech of Will Maslow of the American Jewish Congress, The Uses
of Law in the Struggle for Equality, December, 1954.
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a footnote, and it did ask for further information regarding the probable effects of different procedures of desegration - information
which social scientists were obviously in the best position to provide.
The social scientists involved in the school segregation cases presented studies of the behavior and attitudes of children, which
studies are typically not made by lawyers but by psychologists and
sociologists. According to Cahn, these social scientists provided
weak or unreliable evidence to support what everyone knows
unequivocally by intuition--or, to use a cliche, they "proved the
obvious." Regarding the school segregation issue, he states that
"one speaks in terms of the most familiar and universally accepted
standards of right and wrong when one remarks (1) that racial
segregation under government auspices inevitably inflicts humiliation, and (2) that official humiliation of innocent, law-abiding citizens is psychologically injurious and morally evil." In stating this,
Cahn points up the distinction between the lawyer's approach and
the social scientist's empirical approach based on tests, attitude
surveys, and systematic observation. It is obvious that Cahn is not
aware that the overwhelming majority of white Americans in 1896
believed that segregation was right and just, and that practically
all the relevant literature also took this position. Mr. Justice
Harlan is one of the very few exceptions, but Cahn apparently
thinks his splendid opinion was universal. Any survey of the literature would bear out the fact that, in recent years, it has been the
studies of social scientists which have been building the case
"separate cannot be equal" in contradiction to the Plessy dictum of
"separate but equal." It is true that not all the evidence presented
by the social scientists had a high reliability, but Cahn misses the
point widely when he concentrates his fire on the Clarks' study,
since the evidence he criticizes is merely a minor supplement to a
more basic study published some years ago. He is correct, however, in stating that the social scientist should not present weak
evidence without indicating its weakness.
We shall not know to what extent judges are significantly influenced by social science testimony until they tell us, and this is not
customary, expedient, nor even wise from the standpoint of their
relation to the public and to the losing party It seems to the writer,
however, that in the few cases cited, the social science evidence was
contributory to the decision in that the judges allowed the testimony
and responded to it by questioning and asking for more. This does
not mean, of course, that more traditional lines of argument were
not also important in these cases, nor that social science testimony
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would be relevant in most cases. But there probably are a considerable number of cases coming before the courts every month
in which some facts, now available to social scientists and not presently known to lawyers, are just as materially relevant to the judgment that has to be made as in the cases cited here. The pertinence
of social science evidence will have to be decided by the judges in
each case.
It is very important to note that in the cases cited here, the
social scientist was in no way substituting for the lawyer; the social
scientist cannot be an advocate in his role as scientist. It is equally
important to recognize that the social scientist is not proposing a
new rule to replace the law. He is not suggesting that principles of
ethics or humanitarianism or majority rule (as determined by public opinion polls) replace the law, as some have suggested. What the
social scientist can do in the courtroom is to present certain social
facts that serve as conditions affecting the outcome of the case.
That is, there are certain cases in which the judge must assone
certain social facts to be true before he can arrive at any decision.
He may or may not be aware that he is assuming certain beliefs to
be social facts; there may or may not be evidence available to the
social scientists that the beliefs are or are not true; the lawyers and
the judge are most often not aware that social scientists could
ascertain the validity of their beliefs even when they are aware that
these beliefs are being used as necessary assumptions. Yet these are
the situations in which social scientists could serve as expert witnesses in court cases and possibly affect the outcome of decisions.
Clever lawyers will probably increasingly be aware of the possibility of hiring social scientists to serve as expert witnesses for
their side, and-if this happens-conscientious judges will either
have to acquaint themselves with the possibilities and limitations of
social science to decide when the social science evidence is reliable
or else rely on court-appointed social scientists who are presumably
neutral.
Social science findings, like all scientific conclusions, have only
a certain degree of reliability; the degree of reliability varies from
one finding to another and can often itself be measured. The findings
of sociology and psychology are, almost always, considerably less
reliable than those in physical science, but far from always less
reliable than those in certain of the biological sciences. The reliability of conclusions of sociological and psychological research is generally higher than diagnoses made by psychiatrists, which have
long been acceljted as expert testimony by the courts.
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Another characterstic of social science findings is that they
apply "on the average," to a category of cases, not to every single
case in the category When a finding is made, for example, that a
foster home is better for the development of a child's personalityin terms of certain stated criteria-than is an institutional home,
this does not mean that every child will respond better to placement
in a foster home than in an institution. The judge who has to decide on placement may find the social science finding useful, but
still take into consideration the qualities of the particular foster
home and institution and of the personality of the child in relation
to them.'While social scientists are human beings and humans are
fallible, social scientists are trained to recognize the limitations of
their researches-perhaps better trained in this regard than even
the physical scientists because the methods of the latter are ordinarily beset with fewer limitations. The judge who wishes to make
the best use of social science knowledge and yet be aware of the
limitations of this knowledge can usually directly examine the social
scientist witness as to the applicability and limitations of his testimony
Some lawyers apparently think that social science evidence can
be used to support any point of view or both sides of a given issue
equally well. Cahn, for example, states that "Shrewd, resourceful
lawyers can put a Brandeis brief together in support of almost any
In the last two
conceivable exercise of legislative judgment.
decades, many Brandeis briefs have been conspicuously vulnerable
in respect of statistical method, rationality of inferences from assembled data, adequacy of sampling, and failure to allow for-or to
disclose-negative instances.1 24 If this is what the Brandeis brief
is, lawyers have been readers of the book, How to Lie with Statstics,2 5 but know nothing of legitimate social science. In science,
there are rigorous rules of proof and disproof, and while social
scientists not infrequently find themselves hampered in the application of these rules by the nature of the data, they are aware as to
when they are or are not using the rules.
Mr. Cahn can also be cited as an example of a lawyer unaware
of the difference between a social science and a social ideology He
23. Professor Monrad Paulsen of the University of Minnesota Law
School has suggested that a valuable social science study could be done for
presentation in divorce cases where custody of children is at issue. Is it
better for the child to be raised by one parent or to be ordered to spend, say
nine months with one parent and three months with the other parent?
24. Cahn,op. cit. supra note 2, at 154.
25. Huff, How to Lie With Statistics (1st ed. 1954).
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states: "Recognizing as we do how sagacious Mr. Justice Holmes
was to insist that the Constitution be not tied to the wheels of any
economic system whatsoever, we ought to keep it similarly uncommitted in relation to the other social sciences."20 A system is not a
science, and if an economist advocates a given system he does so
either as any other member of society, or as an economist who
clearly specifies his value premises which are a matter of personal
or group choice. Perhaps unfortunately, sociologists and psychologists are generally less given to advocacy in terms of certain
specified values than are economists. But in any case, it is the
lawyer's task, in a courtroom, to distinguish the value premises
from the facts, the'scientist from the advocate.
Levi puts his finger on another difficulty that will plague the
lawyer who wishes to get the best use out of social science:
"I have no doubt that where the social science materials are
both relevant and available, they will be used by lawyers in
litigation. The competence of the trained lawyer engaged in
controversy insures this. The difficulty, of course, is that for
the greatest part, the material is only somewhat relevant in its
present form and is mostly unavailable. Perfection of the material and its use are then likely to be beyond the resources of the
individual lawyer or law firm."2The problem, of course, is one of the lawyer communicating the
legal issue to a competent social scientist; the social scientist scouring the literature to ascertain if any relevant studies exist; if not,
the social scientist indicating the expense and time necessary to do
an adequate study; the social scientist communicating the scientific
-findings to the lawyer; the lawyer deciding the best way of bringing this evidence into court. Each of these steps can be very difficult; but they are not insuperable.
Louisell, as a teacher of law interested in the use of social
science, has presented an excellent list of injunctions to the social
'scientist-preparing to give expert testimony.28 This writer, a teacher
of sociology, who believes its findings to have high relevance to
the law, would like to close this essay with a few suggestions for
lawyers who might wish to bring in a social scientist to present
expert testimony or who might be confronted with a social scientist
presenting testimony on the other side. (1) Don't accuse the social
scientist of being biased because he has studied a matter for a long
while; this argument can readily be turned against a conscientious
26. Cahn, op. cit. supra note 2, at 167.

27. Levi, op. cit. supranote 6, at 47
28. Louisell, supranote 7, at 257-258.
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lawyer or judge and seems to make a plea for Ignorance. (2) Don't
assume that he knows everything about a given subject or that his
reliable findings apply in all cases. (3) Don't assume that he can
adduce an equally good argument on both sides of an issue. (4)
Don't assume that he is unfamiliar with the logical rules of evidence, or that he cannot distinguish facts from values. (5) Do ask
him what reliable findings he can bring to bear on relevant legal
questions, and what the limitations of these findings are. (6) Do
distinguish his role as scientist from his role of advocate, if he
brings the latter into the controversy

